The Impact of Taiwan’s Judicial Independence Reform on the Operations of Personnel in the Judicial System
Author: Hung-chang Chen, Tzu-ching Kuo & Chin-shou Wang
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
Abstract
Judges in the district courts initiated the Judicial Independence Reform Movement in Taiwan in the early 1990s. This article discusses the impact that the Judicial Independence Reform Movement had on matters of judicial personnel from the perspective of principal-agency theory. We first analyze the institutional changes of the judicial administration system caused by the independence reform of the courts. Second, we construct indicators to evaluate the changes of the appointment of chief justices in district courts and high courts from 1986 to 2015. Last, we argue that the promotion mechanism in Taiwan’s courts has radically changed due to the judicial independence reform. The reform-minded judges who initiated this movement were not punished by the existing judicial system. Also, we did not find that the regime shift had much impact on judicial appointments.