國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

Chang Kia-ngau was a Chinese banker and a high rank offical in the NationalistGovernment  before  the  end  of  World  War  II.  During  the  latter  part  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  (1943  to  1945),  he  had  lived  in  US  and  served  as  a  governmentsponsored researcher focusing on the problems of economies and reconstructions ofChina during the postwar period.In  September  1945,  he  was  assigned  as  the  Chairman  of  the  EconomicCommission  of  the  Northeast  Headquarters  of  the  Nationalist  Government,  whichwas one of the positions to negotiate with the Commander of the Soviet Red Army inManchuria about the restoration of it from Russia to China.Supporting the Army of the Chinese Communist Party to gain controls of partsof Manchuria and expelling the US influence from it were the main strategic targetsof the USSR during the early postwar period. Meanwhile, obstructing the entrance ofthe Nationalist Army into Manchuria deliberately and hoping to sign an agreementwith Her about the Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation in Manchuria were two otherimportant strategic targets of the USSR. Facing the above complex and subtle external situation, T.V. Soong and WangShih-chieh,  the  prime  minister  and  the  minister  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  of  theNationalist Government respectively, set the policies for issues related to Manchuriathat  China  wouldn’t  negotiate  with  any  economic  cooperation  in  Manchuria  withRussia unless the Red Army evacuated completely. These policies consequently ledto the failure of the Nationalist Government to regain Manchuria from the Red Armyin the spring of 1946.During that period, Chang Kia-ngau was one of few important officials in theNationalist  Government  claiming  that  China  should  be  admitted  to  have  anagreement  of  the  economic  cooperation  in  Manchuria  with  Russia  due  to  thepossibility  that  the  Red  Army  might  subsequently  assist  the  Nationalist  Army  toadvance towards Manchuria smoothly. Therefore, the Nationalist Army could at leasthave the possibility to occupy southern parts of Manchuria. Although Mr. Chang’sopinions were suppressed by his directors, his flexible and pragmatistic stands andthe excellent foresight should have been consented.