國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

This  paper  examines  the  literature  on  strategic  triangle  and  the  pivot role, compares  German  diplomacy  under  Otto  von  Bismarck  of  1875-1890 and  the  China  policy  of  the  US  in  the  1990s  as  two  “unintending  pivots,” and analyzes the cause of tilting between wings by unintending pivots. We find  sated  powers  are  more  interested  in  a  menage  à  trios  than  a  romantic triangle. When such powers take the role of a pivot, the chances are that they are  “unintending  pivots.”  Secondly,  for  unintending  pivots  tilting  between wings is determined not by elite strategic thinking, but by domestic politics. In the case of the US China policy, Washington’s tilt towards either Taipei or  Beijing  is  determined  by  the  balance  of  power  between  idealism  and realism, which in turn is synchronized with the presidential electoral cycles. Whenever  presidential  elections  approach,  or  the  opposition  candidate defeats the incumbent (or candidate from the incumbent party), then idealism surges and Washington tilts towards Taipei. During the inter-election periods, however,  realism  rules  and  Washington  tilts  towards  Beijing.  Finally, compared  with  intending  pivots,  unintending  pivots  are  less  committed  to their role in the strategic triangle, and are more prone to make structural tilts towards one wing, thus transforming a romantic triangle to a marriage.