國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

The contrasting impacts of different constitutional and electoral systems areundoubtedly important issues in the research of political institutions. Existingstudies usually consider the advantages and disadvantages of each constitutional orelectoral system separately, and ignore the fact that the two systems are in factembedded together. This paper argues that the most appropriate constitutional andelectoral system for a country can be discovered only when the two systems areconsidered together. Each electoral system produces a different party system, andeach combination of party system and constitutional system also brings about adifferent form of government with its own positive and negative political effects.This paper investigates the strengths and weaknesses of different combinations ofconstitutional and electoral systems on the basis of an analytical frameworkconsisting of four variables: the constitutional system, the electoral system, theparty system and the form of government. Based on this framework, the paper alsomakes some suggestions regarding Taiwan’s constitutional and electoral reforms inthe future. If Taiwan’s constitutional system moves towards presidentialism, inorder to prevent political deadlock the legislature should not adopt a proportionalrepresentation system or compensatory two-vote system. If Taiwan retains a semipresidentialsystem and a proportional representation system or compensatory twovotesystem is adopted for legislative elections, then a minimum vote threshold should be put in place to prevent the emergence of an atomized multi-party system,which may result in political instability. At the same time, the Legislative Yuanshould be granted the power to approve nominations for the position of premier inorder to guard against the emergence of inefficient minority government.