Exploration of Parliamentary Oversight Behaviors under Semi-Presidentialism:A Comparison between Taiwanese Legislative Yuan and French National Assembly
Author: Da-chi Liao & Yueh-ching Chen
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
This paper explores and compares the parliamentary oversight behaviors in the different sub-types of semi-presidentialism, namely Shugart & Carey’s president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism. It further transforms Polsby’s concept of a legislative performance spectrum into a “show-work” spectrum, and then utilizes this to evaluate and compare the oversight behaviors of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, which represents “president- parliamentarism”, and the “premier-presidential” French National Assembly. Based on the theoretical logic of the two sub-types, this paper also selects three issues to compare and examine the oversight behaviors in Taiwan and France, namely the public servant pension system, military acquisition and procurement, and nuclear power. The time span covered by this research is the period between 2007 and 2012, in which both countries experienced a unified government. Moreover, seven jurisdictional powers that are crucial to the exercise of parliamentary oversight functions are subject to detailed data collection and substantial comparison.
This paper finds that the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan is leaning toward a “show” style of oversight behavior, while the French National Assembly is more of a “work” style. However, both parliaments encounter some similar constraints in conducting their oversight duties. The paper, in conclusion, illustrates its research limits and plausible contributions to parliamentary affairs as well as semi-presidential studies.