An Analysis of Strategies and the Effectiveness of US Intervention in Iraq and Its Leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority
Author: Shun-wen Wang
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
The purpose of this paper is to understand the role of foreign interveners in the formation of post-conflict interim governments. It explores several policies and orders of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority as well as the effects of these policies and orders, such as de-Ba’athification, the dismantling of Iraq’s army, the Iraqi Governing Council’s composition, separation of powers between the central government and governorates, returning sovereignty, democratic elections, and the introduction of a free market system during the Coalition Provisional Authority period. The purpose of this paper is to understand the role of foreign interveners in the formation of post-conflict interim governments. It explores several policies and orders of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority as well as their effects such as de-Ba’athification, the dismantling of Iraq’s army, the Iraqi Governing Council’s composition, separation of powers between the central government and governorates, the returning of sovereignty, democratic elections, and the introduction of a free market system during the Coalition Provisional Authority period.
Differing from the numerous articles that place greater emphasis on institutional design and/or the results of the reconstruction process, this paper considers that establishing an institution, or so-called “good governance”, might not be the primary concern of interveners. Instead, the interveners are likely affected by how they view their role(s), grand strategy, and their own country’s interests. This paper elaborates on how the status of fragile states in the international system, as well as the regional and local actors’ positions on reconstruction, are also factors concerning the evaluation of an interim government and its policies.