國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

In 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen officially apologized to the Taiwanese indigenous peoples on behalf of the government. In this unprecedented National Apology, she announced the establishment of the Presidential Office Indigenous Historical and Transitional Justice Committee. In order to make this committee more functional, many indigenous activists have urged the government to learn from the experiences of other countries. Among them, Canada is often considered to be an especially successful case. Some even argue that the Canadian experience in dealing with the legacy of the Indian Residential Schools is a “best practice” for policy learning. Echoing this argument, this article examines the Canadian case through theoretical analysis and empirical data. In so doing, this article attempts to look beyond the policies themselves and analyze the contexts behind them. In Canada, both the National Apology and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) originated from a class-action lawsuit in the mid-2000s. Therefore, the scope of the apology and the role of the TRC was narrowly-framed. The design for these had soon become both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, focusing on a single topic makes it easier for the government to materialize the TRC’s recommendations; on the other hand, it is much harder to expect further structural reforms through the TRC. Ten years after the apology, the relationship between the settler state and the indigenous peoples seems to remain unchanged. Therefore, “best practice” or not, the Canadian experience has its possibilities and limitations. With this in mind, this article further argues that activists in Taiwan have to look beyond the so-called “best practices” and refocus their energy on the details behind the policies.