The Levels of Analysis, Causal Mechanisms, and the Inferential Verifications of Ideas
Author: René Ying-yu Chen
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
Since 2000, there has been a movement toward bringing the micro-level variables of ideas and agency back into the disciplines of political science. Under these various ideational shifts, the agent-based ideas at the micro-level are conceptualized as terms of cognition or as cognitive information processes in social or cognitive psychology that are to be used to make inferences of structural or macro-level explanations on changes of policy-making or institutional transformation. This trend emphasizes that analyses of ideational factors should be unpacked as independent variables which can be operationalized and verified to have causation. Therefore, this paper suggests that studies of ideational variables should follow three lines of operationalization: the clarification of levels of analysis, the concretization of causal mechanisms, and the verification of practical inferences.
To further investigate the points mentioned above, this paper is split into three sections. First, it explores the various definitions of ideas and their denotations in various approaches. Second, it deconstructs the three major theoretical origins of ideas and their models following three lines of operationalization as mentioned above. They are: the structuration theory by Antony Giddens, the modified Coleman’s Boat model from Hedström & Ylikoski’s analytical sociology, and the strategic-relational approach by Bob Jessop and Colin Hay, as well as their extended theories. The final section synthesizes the practices and the limitations of this trend toward ideas. It argues the the ideational turn facilitates the exploration of the structure-agency dilemma with theoretical models, middle-range causal mechanisms, and practical verifications in political science. However, the valid inferences on various mechanisms at different levels need further investigations and evidence-based verifications.