EU Constitution-Building: An Institutionalist Analysis
Author: Hung-dah Su
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
From the federalist view, the Draft Constitutional Treaty may appear asnothing more than “an old bottle for new wine”, while Euro-skeptics will condemnit as a further step toward a European super-state. At the same time, jurists andlawyers are busy arguing whether or not this constitutional treaty has met essentialcriteria defined by constitutionalism. This paper keeps a distance from thosepolitical debates and purely legal arguments and focuses its attention on the degreeto which this constitutional treaty may contribute to European Integration as awhole. Based upon the three-pillared institutionalism presented by Scott and thendeveloped by Laffan, the author concludes that this constitutional treaty does notadvance European Integration as expected by the federalists. Quite to the contrary,though it consolidates the European Union’s legal system, creates importantsymbols for Europe, and presents solemnly European values, the treaty mayseverely cripple the regulatory, normative and cognitive pillars of the EuropeanUnion. The author attributes such a crippling effect to the rapid decline ofenthusiasm for European Integration in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the bestrecipe for reorienting this crippled integration is to rekindle public passion forEurope in a new context totally different from that of fifty, or even twenty, yearsago.