« Taiwan Journal of Political Science No.20Publish: 2004/06

EU Constitution-Building: An Institutionalist Analysis

Author: Hung-dah Su

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

From  the  federalist  view,  the  Draft  Constitutional  Treaty  may  appear  asnothing more than “an old bottle for new wine”, while Euro-skeptics will condemnit  as  a  further  step  toward  a  European  super-state.  At  the  same  time,  jurists  andlawyers are busy arguing whether or not this constitutional treaty has met essentialcriteria  defined  by  constitutionalism.  This  paper  keeps  a  distance  from  thosepolitical debates and purely legal arguments and focuses its attention on the degreeto  which  this  constitutional  treaty  may  contribute  to  European  Integration  as  awhole.  Based  upon  the  three-pillared  institutionalism  presented  by  Scott  and  thendeveloped  by  Laffan,  the  author  concludes  that  this  constitutional  treaty  does  notadvance European Integration as expected by the federalists. Quite to the contrary,though  it  consolidates  the  European  Union’s  legal  system,  creates  importantsymbols  for  Europe,  and  presents  solemnly  European  values,  the  treaty  mayseverely  cripple  the  regulatory,  normative  and  cognitive  pillars  of  the  EuropeanUnion.  The  author  attributes  such  a  crippling  effect  to  the  rapid  decline  ofenthusiasm for European Integration in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the bestrecipe  for  reorienting  this  crippled  integration  is  to  rekindle  public  passion  forEurope in a new context totally different from that of fifty, or even twenty, yearsago.

Keywords:Constitutionalism、EC law、European Constitution、European Union、Institutionalism