Reformulating Justice The Political Logic of the Post-1999 Judicial Reform in China and Its Implications for the Rule of Law
Author: Titus C. Chen
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
The article seeks to explain some contradictions that have arisen in China’sjudicial reform. I argue that these problems came about because the post-1999judicial reform has failed to rein in local and departmental resistance in key issueareas. In principal, the Chinese leadership has accepted the judicial system’s policyprescription of administering the country by law, with the aim of reclaimingcentral control over local state agents. However, the national leadership’s varyingpolitical support for different aspects of judicial reform has resulted in unevenoutcomes and frustrated the goal of judicial centralization. Since 2006, the nationalleadership has reinstituted authoritarian policy imperatives into the existing liberalframework of judicial reform. China’s post-1999 judicial reform has thereforeoscillated between merit-based professionalism and allegiance-oriented demands.Conceptual incompatibility eventually led to behavioral contradictions anddelivered mixed signals regarding the leadership’s intentions.