國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

Globalization and democratization have changed the dynamics between central and local government in Taiwan from the previous hierarchical relationship to new forms of partnership, giving local governments a more prominent role. However, since most financial resources are concentrated in the central government, local governments still lack fiscal autonomy. With the central government controlling the money and power, it is hard to realize genuine local autonomy.  If the central government takes political factors into account when allocating fiscal resources, this may be detrimental to local development.  In this regard, it is meaningful to study what factors may affect the allocation of central governmental grants.  Specifically, incumbent presidents may be inclined to favor magistrates and mayors of the same political party.  On the contrary, in cases of vertical divided government where central and local governments are controlled by different political parties, local governments may lose their advantages in attaining central fiscal grants.  Moreover, the central government may also have other political considerations when deciding on the allocation of grants such as winning more votes in presidential elections.  By analyzing the allocation of intergovernmental grants among 21 counties and cities between 1999 and 2009, this study explores the effects of intergovernmental relations and political factors, such as election year (presidential and local) and the number of seats held by the ruling party in the Legislative Yuan, on the allocation of grants. The results reveal that the central government does not in fact over-reward local governments held by the same party.  In addition, neither election years nor seat-share in the Legislative Yuan make a significant difference to grant distribution. In contrast, winning presidential elections is a top priority for the central government. Therefore fiscal resources tend to flow to local governments in areas in which the incumbent president lost or encountered a tight race in the preceding presidential election.  This suggests that the central government tends to target opposition-held areas and areas where there is strong competition between the two parties with the hope of “stealing” opposition support.  Finally, this study argues that fiscal intergovernmental relations are an important factor in Taiwan’s democratic development and deserve further attention from researchers.