國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

In March 2011, NATO launched the Libyan war in the name of protecting civilians and preventing an impending humanitarian disaster, while at the same time pointing to the necessity of “regime change.” Did, then, there exist a just cause for war in the case of Libya in March 2011? This paper advances two lines of argument against the Libyan war, especially in relation to the “just cause” requirement of the morality of just war. The first, through a critical exposition of the “principle of humanitarian intervention,” argues that the Libya war should not be regarded as a humanitarian intervention in any real sense. Nor, therefore, could this war be justified in such terms. The second, dealing with normative issues concerning regime change and drawing on Michael Walzer and John Rawls, contends that regime change might be a morally permissible cause for war only in extreme cases. On this view, the Libyan war as a regime change operation is not morally acceptable. Regime change did not constitute a just cause for the Libyan war, even if the latter did indeed aim for regime change. The presence of a just cause does not in itself determine whether or not a war is fully just. But a war without a just cause must necessarily be morally deficient. To put it rather more strongly, such a war is morally unjustifiable insofar as just war theory, or a defensible account of it, is concerned.