國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

Abstract

After the Cold War, electoral authoritarian regimes have become a modal type of authoritarian regime. As a result, an increasing number of studies have begun to explore the effect of elections on authoritarian regimes. However, there is disagreement between scholars on the effects of elections. One camp argues that such elections are an instrument used by rulers to stabilize authoritarian regimes; another camp argues that elections undermine authoritarian regimes and make democratization more likely. Do authoritarian elections foster or weaken authoritarian regimes?

This article argues that the function of elections depends on the context, and that the key contextual factor is the level of electoral competitiveness. Under low level electoral competition, elections consolidate authoritarian regimes. In contrast, under high level electoral competition, elections provide an opportunity structure for the opposition to achieve democratization. The main unit of analysis is electoral authoritarian regimes from 1975-2007. The research employs a time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the research hypotheses and discuss the dynamic differences between two subtypes of electoral authoritarianism: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. The two subtypes of authoritarianism both hold elections but their dynamic behaviors are distinct in terms of the level of electoral competitiveness. The empirical result reveals that competitive authoritarian regimes are unstable. In addition, they are not only more likely than hegemonic authoritarian regimes to democratize, but also more likely to undergo autocratic reversal.