國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

This article argues that under the existing political and legal system, the application of the principle of territorial exclusivity to deal with territorial disputes leads to hidden structural contradictions. In addition, the same values hinder the resolution of disputes. meaning that many disputes end up in structural quagmires. Therefore, when we look at disputes from a structural perspective, an important question naturally arises: are there any solutions that are more reasonable than either side simply occupying the disputed territory? However, this is only a theoretical question, as under the current international system, other proposals are not represented in the dialogue. Therefore, this paper uses compromise arrangements as a starting point to analyze territorial disputes, and on this basis, puts forward a theoretical framework for the territorial principle, establishing the “principle that territorial disputes are non-exclusive.” When each side supports the above principle and the expansion of existing political and legal systems, the theoretical question above becomes a real question. Overall, space is created for alternative dispute resolution proposals, including compromise arrangements. Specifically, the non-exclusivity principle for disputed territory can be understood as a special or weakened form of the principle of territorial exclusivity. On this basis, there is no essential contradiction between compromise arrangements and exclusivity. The former is simply a special and weakened version of the latter. From this perspective, we can understand how these two conflicting approaches are reconciled. These two approaches reveal the overall goal of this article to use specific measures to guide the construction of the system, and apply the power and logical of the current system to promote concrete practice.