國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

The conventional wisdom on comparative constitutional engineering argues, on the basis of the successful experiences of France and Portugal, that the operation of premier-presidentialism (one subtype of semi-presidentialism) has been more stable than the operation of president-parliamentarism (the other subtype of semi-presidentialism). However, some newly democratized countries which have chosen premier-presidentialism have witnessed political instability. This paper aims to explore why these countries have suffered from political instability and to identify the crucial factors which facilitate the democratic workability of premier-presidentialism, by way of analyzing these negative cases.

Past research claims that the constellation of political parties in the parliament is the key factor affecting political stability and also suggests that if the president’s party is included in the ruling coalition, then it can substantially contribute to the political stability of premier-presidentialism. After delving into the cases of Romania and Ukraine, this paper further argues that not only do we need to observe whether the president’s party is in the coalition, but we also need to examine whether the president’s party has a dominant position in the coalition. If the prime minister’s party, rather than the president’s party, takes the helm in the coalition, presidential power and authority may be constrained, thereby leading to the clashes between the president and prime minister and sometimes to serious political instability. In contrast, when the president’s party leads the coalition, conflicts between the president and prime minister are less likely, leading to greater political stability.

r, under a vertical dual-executive system, the president is regarded as a leader only under exceptional circumstances. These two different dual-executive systems both conform to standard definitions of semi-presidentialism, but their constitutional operations are entirely different.