Cabinet Stability Under Unified Government: The Cases of Russia and Taiwan After the 2008 Presidential Elections
Author: Feng-yu Lee, Meng-ho Lan
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
Taiwan and Russia have shared some important similarities in terms of institutional configurations since the presidential elections of 2008. Taiwan and Russia are led by presidents with strong constitutional powers, and face little legislative opposition from friendly parliaments. In both cases, the president belongs to a party than controls around two-thirds of parliamentary seats. However, contrary to the claims of much of the existing literature, these similarities do not make the cabinets of the two countries equally stable. This paper argues that, because of important differences in who wields actual political power, cabinet stability varies across the two cases. Three factors decides where the apex of political power is located: how the president is elected, how easily he or she can be removed from the presidency, and whether a president serves as a de facto leader of the biggest party of a parliament. This paper undertakes an in-depth comparison between Russia and Taiwan, providing supporting evidence for a link between the location of the apex of political power and cabinet stability under unified government.