國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

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This paper explores Rawls’s justification for political consensus in a pluralistic society. Rawls argues that although value diversity is the fact of a modern democratic society, reasonable citizens would follow a political conception of justice endorsed by the overlapping consensus between different kinds of comprehensive doctrines to resolve fundamental constitutional conflicts and conflicts about basic justice. However, his idea of public reason could be challenged from four aspects, namely completeness, fairness, uniqueness and publicity. Facing these criticisms, Rawls has revised his theory in three aspects. First, he supplemented his idea of exclusive view of public reason with an inclusive view of public reason and a wide view of public reason. Secondly, he argued that public reason is determined by a family of liberal political conceptions of justice, and fairness is just one of them. Finally, in accordance with the idea of public reason, he asserted that we can make a political decision by voting if it is necessary. By reviewing the challenges to and revisions of Rawls’s public reason theory, this paper argues that Rawlsian deliberative theory, justified by the wide view of public reason and the wide reflective equilibrium, could further amend Rawls’ revisions. It could enhance the capability of Rawls’s public reason theory and the justification of public consensus in a pluralistic society by interpreting public reason through public deliberation.