國立臺灣大學政治科學論叢

Abstract / Chinese PDF Download

This study aims to explore both the institutional and non-institutional factors under semi-presidentialism that may lead to the collapse of democracy, and to study the mechanisms of these democratic crises. Utilizing the principal-agent theory, veto player theory and coup theory, this research argues that compared with premier-presidentialism, president-parliamentary constitutions are more probable to create disputes regarding the formation of the government as well as policy paralysis between the assembly and the elected president, thereby increasing the likelihood of coup intervention and administrative dictatorship, both being detrimental to democratic survival. The results of survival analysis are as follows. Firstly, owing to the institutional drawbacks of president-parliamentarism, its chance to experience a democratic breakdown is higher than the other subtype of semi-presidentialism. Secondly, of all the economic factors, GDP growth rate is the only significant variable and has a negative impact on the dependent variable. Thirdly, countries that had historically experienced more successful coups will have a higher likelihood to suffer from democratic collapse, due to lower risk faced by their military officials engaged in the coup and the coup trap. Finally, our results also show that president-parliamentarism, combined with poor economic development and possible coup threats, does not necessarily generate a high possibility of ending in a democratic collapse.