Constitutional Jurisprudence and Institutional Resilience of Taiwanese Semi-Presidentialism
Author: Chwen-wen Chen
Abstract / Chinese PDF Download
On the surface, semi-presidentialism creates a more flexible regime as it may switch between presidentialism and parliamentarism whenever it deems necessary. It seems that the institutional resilience of semi-presidentialial system is better than that of other political layouts. However, institutional flexibility of semi-presidentialism could also create rooms for controversy. Fortunately, constitutional judicial review, in general, could strengthen the resilience of semi-presidentialism by performing its function of textual interpretation to solve political conflicts. Nonetheless, after being in place for nearly seventy years and particularly after the constitutional reform in 1997, the constitutional judicial review in the ROC has lost bit by bit its function of resolving political conflicts . The aim of this article is to analyze the reasons of its decline and to put forward some proposals for future reform.